Tuesday, September 30, 2008

Warrior Ethos: The Soldier's Creed

Soldier Creed Video

Also check out this the Army's Warrior Ethos site

Cadet Professional Development AKO Webpage

Cadet Command G3 has established an AKO webpage that contains all
pertinent information regarding Cadet Professional Development Training at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/589415.

Thursday, September 18, 2008

Where Can I Get a Military ID

To find the closest place to get a military ID by zip code search go to

Wednesday, September 17, 2008

4th Generation Warfare Defined

Terror War Defenses

Jack Kelly op-ed in Washington Times

[17 October 2004, p. B4]

Two superb books put in context the global war on terror, and explain why the battle for Iraq is critical to victory.

Thomas Barnett is a professor at the Naval War College, and creator of what may be history's most famous Pentagon briefing. Col. Thomas Hammes is a Marine with considerable experience in intelligence and special operations.

In "The Pentagon's New Map," Mr. Barnett defines the security challenge of the 21st century in terms of "the Core" (prosperous democracies integrated into the world economy) and "the Gap" (failed states disconnected from globalization). The key to peace is reducing the number of states in the Gap.

In "The Sling and the Stone," Col. Hammes describes Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), and outlines steps America must take to wage it effectively.

In first-generation war, practiced from the misty depths of pre-history to just before World War I, groups of soldiers in close proximity whale away at each other with swords, spears, battle axes and, later, muskets. The object was to destroy enemy fighting forces.

Second-generation warfare was like the first, with the addition of artillery and other indirect fires. The objective�to destroy the enemy's fighting formations�was the game.

Third-generation warfare, inaugurated by the German Blitzkrieg in World War II, shifted the primary objective from the enemy's fighting forces to his logistical base and command-and-control systems.

In 4GW, inaugurated by Mao Tse-Tung and improved upon by the Vietnamese communists, the main target is the enemy's will to fight. Battlefield successes are less important than the ability to exploit them for propaganda.

Two characteristics of 4GW that differ from earlier generations of war is there are no ethical boundaries�noncombatants are often the preferred target because killing them can have a greater impact on enemy morale�and there are no quick victories. 4GW wars are measured in decades, not years.

A common theme for Mr. Barnett and Col. Hammes is the Pentagon cannot prepare for war as if it were separable from everything else. In modern war, "everything else" (the economy, public perceptions, nation-building) are often more important than winning fights on the battlefield.

Mr. Barnett's is a hopeful book. He believes globalization has all but outlawed war between states, because the costs of war to a country connected to the world economy vastly outweigh any potential benefits successful war could bring. Col. Hammes is less optimistic but agrees with Mr. Barnett that the kind of war for which the Pentagon is preparing is most unlikely.

Nation-building is a critical component for victory in 4GW conflicts. Only with nation-building can the Gap be shrunk, Mr. Barnett says. Only by providing a better idea and example can the United States defeat an ideological group like al Qaeda, Col. Hammes says.

Both think the Pentagon needs a major overhaul if we're to win the war on terror and future 4GW wars.

Mr. Barnett thinks our military needs to be divided into a (smaller) traditional military force and a (larger) "system administration" force that would do the dirty work of peacekeeping and nation-building.

Col. Hammes' goals are more modest and more practical. We need fewer of the kinds of units�heavy armor, air defense, tactical fighters, submarines�designed for fighting enemies who have largely vanished. We need more of the kinds of units�military police, intelligence, civil affairs, leg infantry�useful for peacekeeping and nation-building.

What's needed most in the Pentagon, Mr. Barnett and Col. Hammes agree, is a change in attitude. Military leaders must be able to work closely with civilian agencies to win the war on terror. Military bureaucracies must be flattened so field troops can respond quicker to rapidly developing situations.

Most important, our military and political leaders must recognize that 4GW conflicts are chiefly wars of ideas, and the best weapons we have in such conflicts are our better ideas.

"The fundamental message of the United States is the most powerful message ever crafted by mankind: We treasure the individual and provide an environment where every person can strive for his or her own dreams," Col. Hammes said. "It is up to us to harness that message and use it to win."

Jack Kelly, a syndicated columnist, is a former Marine and Green Beret and a former deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force in the Reagan administration. He is national security writer for the Pittsburgh (Pa.) Post-Gazette.


Tuesday, September 16, 2008

Learn About the Different Army Branches

For a good intro to the careers in the different Army Branches go to

Sunday, September 14, 2008

Nested Concpet

"Nested concepts is not clearly understood at the tactical level and, as a result, units are having difficulty focusing combat power and getting every asset to contribute to the main effort's success. What is meant by nested concepts?

The most definitive reference available for nested concepts is General William E. DuPuy's article in Army, August 1988, page 31, "Concepts of Operation: The Heart of Command, The Tool of Doctrine", which states:

Cascading concepts carry the top commander's intentions to the lowest levels, and the nesting of those concepts traces the critical path of concentration and priorities. This is the phenomenon the Germans called schwerpunkt. The concepts are nested like mixing bowls in a kitchen. Each must fit within the confines of the larger and accommodate the next smaller and so on down to the squad, the tank, and the brave soldier himself. It is the only method by which the talent and initiative of commanders and troops at every level can be engaged and exploited.

There should be a direct link between the task and purpose of subordinate units and fires and the task force main effort's task and purpose. If the direct link is not established, the TF has failed to achieve unity of effort. Company commanders and specialty platoon leaders should ask themselves this question: What is my unique contribution to the TF fight and the main effort's success? If you cannot determine your role, you are the wasted effort!"

NESTED CONCEPTS: Are You a Main Effort, a Supporting Effort, or a Wasted Effort? by LTC Michael Shields